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1 Introduction
Bundling is an ubiquitous phenomenon. It is observed in many markets not only of
traditional consumption goods but also in newly developed ones such as the market
for information technologies (IT). Figure 1 shows the household penetration of
bundled offers at the EU level according to the 12th Report on the Implementation
of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package 2006.
 
Figure 1: Bundles in the EU
This paper aims at offering a broad view of the arguments driving firms to
engage in bundling in the market for telecommunications, and the need to regulate.
Product bundling is a marketing strategy by which a firm offering several prod-
ucts separately, also gives a discount to those consumers purchasing the products
as a single combined product (a package). As we will see, bundling practices are a
particular form of price discrimination.
Price discrimination generically refers to the ability of a firm to sell its products
at different prices so that the value per unit of the product differs across consumers
(see Tirole, 1988, ch.3). Pigou (1920) distinguished three types of price discrim-
ination according to three different criteria. First degree price discrimination (or
perfect discrimination) arises when the firm charges the price corresponding to
the willingness to pay for each unit to each consumer. Second-degree price dis-
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Figure 2: Non-linear prices.
crimination appears when a firm links the price to the volume bought. Finally,
third-degree price discrimination links the price to some characteristic of the con-
sumer (age, gender, income, etc). An extensive account of the literature on price
discrimination can be found in Phlips (1983, 1988) and Varian (1989).
Under this taxonomy, bundling practices are a manifestation of second-degree
price discrimination. As prices depend on the quantity bought, they are referred to
as non-linear prices. Under these pricing scheme, different quantities are bought
at different average prices, thus reflecting for instance, price discounts according
to volume. Figure 2 shows several pricing schedules (or tariffs in the jargon of
industrial organization). Tariff A represents a two-part tariff. The vertical intercept
represents the access fee to the market (e.g. an entry fee, or a connexion fee),
and the slope of the tariff represents the marginal price, and the slope of the line
from the origin to a point in the tariff, the average price. That is, the average price
faced by a consumer buying quantity q1 is given by (the tangent of the angle) α.
Similarly, the average price for a quantity q2 is given by (the tangent of the angle)
β. Note that in line with the definition of second-degree price discrimination, each
volume of the product entails a different average price.
TariffB represents a four-part tariff, and tariffC represents the limit case where
an infinitesimal variation of the amount bought yields a different average price.
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2 Bundling
Product bundling is a marketing strategy that involves offering several products
and/or services for sale as one combined product. This combined product is offered
at a discount price, so that it is cheaper to buy the products and services as a bundle
than separately. This strategy is most often found in multiproduct industries such
as telecommunications, hardware and software, or fast-food. The products grouped
in a bundle are often referred to as a package. Bundling is generally implemented
when the seller thinks that the characteristics of two or more products and services
are such that these products might appeal to many consumers more as a package
than as individual offerings. However, as we will see, even in the absence of these
complementarities, bundling can also prove to be beneficial to firms or even to
increase overall welfare. For instance, internet access and telephone services are
independent products in the sense that in general, enjoying internet access does
not increase the enjoyment of telephone services. And yet we observe bundling of
these services often.
Several notions of bundling can be distinguished. Pure bundling occurs when
a consumer can only purchase the entire bundle or nothing, and mixed bundling
occurs when consumers are offered a choice between the purchasing of the entire
bundle or one, or both of the separate parts of the bundle.
A related concept is that of tying which refers to an intermediate situation
where a firm makes conditional the purchase of a second service when a customer
wishes to buy a first service. In this situation, only the first service cannot be bought
separately. As opposed to bundling, tying may be dynamic, for example when the
purchase of future services is conditioned to the purchase of a service today. This
is typical of services with aftermarkets, for example, photocopier machines and
the repair and maintainance of those machines or cameras and complements for
those cameras. Tying can be contractual or by design. For example a telecom case
occurs when the purchase of access (line rental) results in the impossibility to pur-
chase follow-on services from other companies (telephone or broadband services
for example). Tying is a business practice which may have detrimental effects on
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consumers and welfare and this is reflected on Article 82 (d) of the Treaty of Rome
where the following is defined as an abuse of dominant position: “Making the con-
clusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to comercial usage, have no con-
nection with the subject of such contracts”. This clause has also been used to argue
that bundling is an abuse. However, there is a common understanding that tying
and bundling are common practices that may have positive effects and will only
have anticompetitive consequences under certain circumstances.1 Any interven-
tion that takes place will only justified after a detailed case analysis establishing
such harmful effects.
Several motives to engage in bundling practices can be identified. Among
them, we focus our attention in (i) bundling as a means to price discriminate, (ii)
bundling as a means to reach efficiencies, and (iii) bundling as a means for an anti-
competitive outcome. Also, bundling can be used as a tool to reduce the divergence
in incentives between manufacturers and distributors among other reasons.
A first argument examines bundling by a monopolist as a (second-degree) price
discrimination tool. Under this perspective, bundling works best when the values
attached to the bundled goods are negatively correlated (see Adams and Yellen
1976, McAfee et al. 1989, Schmalensee 1982). That is, a consumer values one
of the products of the bundle more than the other consumer, while values less the
second product of the bundle. In that case, offering both products in a bundle
reduces the between consumer variation in reservation values, allowing the seller
to extract more surplus from consumers. To illustrate think of situation with two
consumers (A and B) and two goods (1 and 2). Consumer A values commodity 1
at 80 e, and commodity 2 at 25 e; in turn, consumer B values good 1 in 70
eand good 2 in 30 e. If offered separately, the seller would maximize profits at
prices p1 = 70, p2 = 25 to obtain profits of 190 e. If offered the opportunity,
Consumer A would be willing to buy the package with both goods at a price of
105 e, and consumer B would value the bundle at 100 e. Note that the dispersion
1See for example the DG competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the
Treaty of Rome.
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of valuations for the bundle is smaller that for the separate goods. The seller can
use it to its advantage by selling the package at a price of 100 eto collect profits
of 200 e. The bundling strategy is also effective when valuations are independent,
but gains from bundling disappear when values are positively correlated.
A second argument relates to efficiency reasons. This appears when firms use
technologies exhibiting (some of) these characteristics: (i) economies of scale and
scope in production, (ii) economies of scope in distribution, (iii) low marginal costs
of bundling, and (iv) high production set-up costs. Salinger (1995) offers a cost-
savings argument to justify bundling a a way to generate a more valuable product.
This cost synergy is based on the higher capacity of a firm to integrate product vis-
a-vis consumers. Under this perspective, bundling is typically pro-competitive and
consumer friendly. As such, it usually does not call for any regulatory intervention.
A third aspect of bundling is its use as a strategic entry deterrence tool. Several
papers have identified the economic mechanisms by which bundling can be used
by a dominant firm as a tool for anticompetitive effects. Generally these papers
describe a situation where a monopoly in a service market bundles this service with
another service where there is some rivalry in order to leverage market power, with
effects in the market for the bundled service (with some rivalry) and the bundling
service (with a monopoly).
The seminal work of Whinston (), overcame the Chicago Critique that one one
monopoly rent was possible by explaining bundling how the incentives to sell more
of the monopoly service through the bundle result on a business stealing effect (re-
ducing prices and/or the rivals demand in service B) that depresses the rivals prof-
itability and the firm profitability in the bundled service market. The exclusionary
effect takes place if rivals in this second market have fixed costs which they cannot
recoup in the presence of the bundle. In such cases, the monopoly will use a com-
mitment to bundling in order to induce exit (and prevent entry). Nalebuff (2004)
provides a second reason why bundling may be used as a strategic entry deterrence
tool in the monopolized market. He considers a set-up where a firm with market
power in two goods can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with
6
only one of those goods to enter the market. He argues that “[a]lthough price dis-
crimination provides a reason to bundle, the gains are small compared with the
gains from the entry-deterrent effect.” (p.160) However, the role of the correlation
of the values associated to the goods are reversed with respect to the case of price
discrimination. That is, bundling is most effective as entry deterrent device when
values are positively correlated. This is so because, in that case the same popula-
tion of consumers is buying both goods, and a one-product entrant cannot satisfy
those consumers. In contrast, when values are negatively correlated markets for
both commodities are essentially different. Accordingly, a single-product entrant
is able to serve the market for that product. Hence, regulators should be cautious
in their appraisal of the relationship between bundled goods. Bundling should be
discouraged when goods are positively correlated,
Kobayashi (2005a,b) offer a nice overview of the literature. We can quote
Kobayashi (2005b) to summarize these arguments:
In many cases where bundling is observed, the reason why separate
goods are sold in a package is easily explained on efficiency grounds.
This is certainly the presumptive explanation for bundling when it oc-
curs in highly competitive markets. These efficiency based explana-
tions also apply with equal force to the use of bundling by firms with
market power. In addition, firms with market power can use bundling
(...) as a price discrimination device, or as a way to internalize pricing
externalities in the presence of complementary goods.
However, in markets where firms can exercise monopoly power, bundling
can have anticompetitive uses that may be scrutinized under the an-
titrust laws. (...) Because bundling can also be an efficient practice
when firms possess market power, any rational antitrust evaluation
of bundling must simultaneously consider both the strategic and ef-
ficiency reasons for bundling.
Section 3 presents an example where a monopolist producing two goods de-
7
cides whether to offer those products (i) separately, or (ii) in a (pure) bundle, or
(iii) both (mixed bundling) assuming away efficiency and entry deterrence consid-
erations. To simplify the comparison between the different scenarios it is assumed
that the prices of the goods when sold separately remain the same under bundling.
This is relaxed in a subsequent example. The main conclusion of the example is
that given a distribution of reservation prices, mixed bundling yields higher produc-
tion levels as compared to pure bundling and no bundling. The relative profitability
of the three strategies depends on the distribution of the reservation prices on the
population of consumers. This goes in line with McAfee et al. (1989). Also, Fang
and Norman (2006) characterize when the effect of pure bundling of lowering the
variance of the willingness to pay is strong enough to dominate separate sales. The
numerical example that we provide also serves the purpose to highlight the fact that
the use of bundling strategies as a price discrimination device may work when the
market is monopolized. The presence of competition (be it perfect or imperfect),
would alleviate the equity concerns associated with price discrimination.
Section 4 is devoted to bundling and tying where only one firm can bundle the
two services. This is when a firm makes the purchase of one product over which
it has a monopoly power (the so called tying or bundling good) conditional on the
purchase of a second good.2
Section 5 reviews the literature on the effects of bundling when all firms can
bundle services.
Section 6 draws some conclusions in the case of telecommunications.
3 Bundling by a monopolist in both goods. An illustrative
example
To illustrate some elements behind bundling decisions, consider a very simple sce-
nario described by a monopolist producing and selling two products 1, 2. Those
goods are produced with a constant marginal cost technology without fixed costs.
2Note that this second good may be sold separately by the firm (tying) or may not be sold sepa-
rately by the firm (pure bundling).
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Denote these marginal costs by c1 and c2. If the monopolist decides to bundle both
goods in a package composed of one unit of each good, the marginal cost of the
bundle is given by cb = c1 + c2.
Consumers have a reservation price for each good and for the bundle, denoted
byR1,R2, andRb = R1+R2. The distribution of these reservation prices over the
population of consumers is given and known to the firm. Each consumer buys at
most, one unit of each product (i.e. one unit of product 1, or one unit of product 2,
or one unit of the bundle).
Note that these assumptions exclude scale and scope economies in the produc-
tion of the bundle, as well as any consumption complementarities. Therefore, if a
consumer (and the firm) finds advantageous to acquire (and offer) the bundle it is
not as a consequence of these phenomena. It is also convenient to point out that (in
mixed bundling) as the value of the bundle is not larger than the sum of the values
of its components, the decision to offer the bundle only makes sense if it is offered
at a discount price.
This example allows for considering three market strategies:
1. No bundling: the firm sells both products at their respective monopoly prices
(pm1 , p
m
2 ).
2. Pure bundling: the firm only offers a bundle at a profit maximizing price pmb .
3. Mixed bundling: the firm offers each good separately together with the bun-
dle at profit maximizing prices (p1, p2, pb).
In general, we should expect pi 6= pmi as the numerical example below shows.
However, to ease comparisons, we assume that (p1, p2, pb) = (pm1 , p
m
2 , p
m
b ).
3.1 No bundling
When the firm gives up the possibility of bundling and sells each good separately
at monopoly prices, the market is segmented in four groups. As figure 3 shows,
consumers in area A are endowed with reservations prices such that Ri ≥ pi (i =
1, 2), and thus they buy both products.
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Figure 3: Market segmentation with monopoly prices.
Consumers in areasB andD have one reservation price above the market price
of one of the goods, and the other reservation price below the market price of the
other good. Accordingly, these consumers buy only one of the products. Con-
sumers in area B buy good 2, and consumers in area D acquire good 1.
Finally, consumers in area C are endowed with reservations prices such that
Ri ≤ pi (i = 1, 2), and thus they cannot afford any of the products.
3.2 Pure bundling
Assume our monopolist decides to offer only the bundle (composed of one unit of
each good) at a price pb. Now the market is segmented in two groups as figure 4 il-
lustrates. The price of the bundle is represented by a line with slope of−1 defining
the two groups of consumers.
Consumers in area E are characterized by a reservation price above the market
price of the bundle. Thus, those consumers buy the bundle. In contrast, consumers
in area F cannot afford the bundle and thus are excluded of the market.
3.3 Mixed bundling
Consider now the situation where the monopolist decides to offer both goods sep-
arately together with the bundle. Assume, as commented above, pb < p1 + p2.
Figure 5 illustrates the scenario where again the space of consumers is split in four
regions.
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Figure 4: Market segmentation with pure bundling.
Consumers in the (open) area defined as G ≡ 0p2xyp1 are characterized by
Ri < pi, i = 1, 2, b. Accordingly, these are consumers that do not find it profitable
to buy any of the products and thus, are expelled of the market.
The area H ≡ p1yz can be seen as formed by two triangles. Consumers in
the lower triangle p1ypb, are characterized by R1 ≥ p1, R2 < p2, and Rb < pb.
Therefore, they buy product 1. Consumers in the upper triangle pByz are char-
acterized by R1 > p1, R2 < p2, and R1 + R2 = Rb ≥ pb. Therefore, they
have acccess to both product 1 and also to the bundle. However, these consumers
in the upper triangle obtain more surplus from good 1 than form the bundle be-
cause (R1 − p1) > (R1 + R2 − pb), or R2 < pb − p1. This is so because along
the segment yz it follows that R2 = p1y = p1pb = pb − p1. Joining together both
triangles, we conclude that consumers located in the area H buy product 1.
A parallel argument leads us to conclude that consumers in the area I ≡ p2xw
buy good 2.
Finally, the fourth (closed) area J ≡ wxyz describes those consumers buying
the bundle. These are consumers satisfying R1 + R2 ≥ pb, R1 ≤ pb − p2,
and R2 ≤ pb − p1. Accordingly, these consumers obtain more surplus from the
consumption of the bundle than from either of the products separately.
Let us focus our attention in comparing the case of no bundling with that of
mixed bundling by observing the corresponding four groups of consumers in fig-
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Figure 5: Market segmentation with mixed bundling.
ures 3 i 5. First we compare the sets of consumers who do not participate in the
market. Area C in figure 3 is larger than the corresponding area G in figure 5.
Namely, the difference is given by the triangle xry. This area accounts for those
consumers that do not find it profitable to buy either good 1 or good 2, in the ab-
sence of bundling, while they find the bundle profitable when it is offered.
A similar argument also applies to areasB andD when compared with areasH
and I, respectively. Some consumers that find only profitable one of the goods
without bundling, have access to the bundle when it is offered, and decide to buy it
instead of the corresponding single product.
Finally, consumers in area A that were already buying both goods under no
bundling, when the bundle is available (those in area J) continue to buy both goods
but at a lower price.
Summing up, we conclude that mixed bundling implies higher production lev-
els as compared to the situation of no bundling. When the bundle is available,
some consumers that were buying product 2 (in area B) now acquire the bundle,
thus implying an increase in the production of good 1. Similarly, some consumers
that were buying product 1 (in area D) now acquire the bundle, thus implying an
increase in the production of good 2. Finally, some consumers that were left out of
the market (in area C) now have access to the bundle leading to an increase in the
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production of both products. Accordingly, there is an efficiency gain when moving
from no bundling to mixed bundling.
The comparison between pure and mixed bundling is not as clear cut. On the
one hand, some consumers (in area F ) that were out of the market under pure
bundling, decide to buy good 1 under mixed bundling (lower triangle in area H).
Thus an increase in production of good 1 is to be observed. However, some con-
sumers that were buying the bundle under pure bundling (in area E, when offered
the possibility of buying product 1 only do so thus inducing a reduction in the
production of product 2 (upper triangle in area H). A parallel argument when
comparing areas E,F and I yields an increase in the production of good 2 and a
decrease in the production of product 1.
The relative profitability of the three strategies depends on the distribution of
reservation prices on the consumer population.
The following numerical example illustrates some of these features.
3.4 A numerical example
Consider a firm operating in a market with four consumersA,B,C,D. Their reser-
vation prices for the different products are given in table 1.
R1 R2 Rb
A 10 90 100
B 45 55 100
C 60 40 100
D 90 10 100
Table 1: Reservation prices.
Production is carried out under constant marginal costs c1 = 20 and c2 = 30.
The situation is depicted in figure 6.
For future reference, note that the first best solution consists in the firm selling
at the corresponding reservation prices, good 2 to consumer A, good 1 to con-
sumer D, and both products to consumers B and C. This yields a level of profits
of 230 e.
If the firm decides to follow a no bundling strategy, profits are maximized for
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Figure 6: A numerical example.
p1 = 60, p2 = 90, and the associated level of profits is of 140. At these prices,
consumer D obtains a surplus of 30 while consumers A and B are excluded of the
market of product 1. Also, consumers B,C,D are excluded of market of good 2.
From the firm’s viewpoint, this situation is far from the first best solution where all
consumers have the opportunity to buy at least one of the products.
If the firm follows a pure bundling strategy, it will offer the bundle at a price pb =
100. All consumers will buy, and the firm will obtain profits of 200. This strategy
yields profits closer to the ones corresponding to first degree price discrimination
(first best solution), because all consumers buy and none retains any surplus. How-
ever, even though consumersA andD have a reservation price for one of the goods
below the marginal cost, they find it beneficial to consume them through the bun-
dle. This possibility would not arise in a first degree price discrimination situation.
Naturally, this situation appears more frequently the higher the marginal produc-
tion costs. The example illustrates how total willingness to pay for the bundle is
harmonized across consumers, which allows for full rent extraction by the firm. Of
course, in richer situations only a fraction of the rents would be extracted through
the bundle. The point we want to stress is that rent extraction is facilitated by
bundling whenever consumers’ willingness to pay for each product are negatively
correlated (and above marginal costs). This will be further illustrated below.
Finally, if the firm uses a mixed bundling strategy, it has four categories to
14
classify consumers. The firm can sell product 1 to consumer D at a price p1 = 90;
can sell product 2 to consumer A at a price p2 = 90; and can sell the bundle to
consumers B and C at a price pb = 100. This strategy replicates the first best
strategy, thus yielding profits of 230. All consumers are served, and none retains
any surplus. Moreover, consumers A and D do not find it profitable to buy the
product whose marginal cost is above their respective reservation prices.
Table 2 summarizes the outcome of the three strategies described reporting for
each strategy, prices, quantities, profits, consumer surplus and total welfare.
Strat. p1 p2 pb q1 q2 qb pi CS W
no B 60 90 - 2(C,D) 1(A) - 140 30 170
pure B - - 100 - - 4 200 0 200
mixed B 90 90 100 1(D) 1(A) 2(B,C) 230 0 230
Table 2: Outcomes under the three strategies.
This example illustrates that the firm can attain the levels of profits associated
to the first degree price discrimination by means of a mixed bundling strategy.3
These examples help to understand why restaurants offer closed menus to-
gether with a` la carte menu. The same dish is more expensive when we order
it isolated than within a closed menu. There are no scale economies in prepar-
ing the dishes contained in the closed menu as compared with those same dishes
offered a` la carte. Quoting Adams and Yellen (1976, p.488),
Some people value an appetizer relatively highly (soup on a cold day),
others may value dessert relatively highly (Baked Alaska, unavailable
at home), but all might wish to pay roughly the same amount for a
complete dinner. The a` la carte menu is designed to capture consumer
surplus from those gastronomes with extremely high valuations of par-
ticular dishes, while the complete dinner is designed to retain those
with lower variance in their reservation prices.
In general, the mixed bundling is the strategy yielding the highest levels of prof-
its when some consumers have reservation prices below the marginal production
3Note as commented above, that monopoly prices and mixed bundle prices do not coincide.
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cost of one of the products. However, it should not be inferred from this example
that all consumers fulfilling this characteristic will be excluded of the market of
that product. Often a trade-off appears as the most profitable strategy may exclude
some consumers of the market in order to minimize the surplus retained by those
consumers served by the firm.
The reasoning exposed suggests that the dispersion (variance) of the reserva-
tion prices within each market segment plays an important role. In our example,
consumersB and C (the ones acquiring the bundle) have similar (high) reservation
prices for the individual products. It turns out that in general the mixed bundling
strategy yields higher profits than any of the two other alternative strategies when
consumers having high reservation price for the bundle, also evaluate the individ-
ual goods in a similar fashion. In that case, the firm addresses the bundle to those
consumers with highest preference for the bundle, and the individuals products to
those consumers with highest preference for the corresponding single product. In
this way, the firms manages to extract the maximum surplus from the consumers.
To further elaborate this point, we propose three variations of the example.
The first variation is shown in table 3. It shows extremely dispersed reservation
prices. They are so dispersed that valuations sometimes fall below the marginal
cost. This example is reminiscent of the third-degree price discrimination is the
R1 R2 Rb
A 10 90 100
B 10 90 100
C 90 10 100
D 90 10 100
Table 3: Highly dispersed reservation prices.
sense that consumers can be identified by their strong preference for either one
product or the other.
Note that the first best solution in this case yields a welfare level of 260, when
both goods are sold at a price of 90, consumers A and B demand product 2, while
consumers C and D demand good 1. This outcome can be mimicked by the firm
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with a no bundling strategy, as well as a mixed bundling strategy.
Under pure bundling, the firm sells the product to all four consumers at a price
of 100 to obtain profits of 200 e. Therefore, under an extremely dispersed distri-
bution of reservations prices, no bundling allows for higher (highest indeed) profits
than pure bundling. Table 4 summarizes.
Strat. p1 p2 pb q1 q2 qb pi CS W
no B 90 90 - 2(C,D) 2(A,B) - 260 0 260
pure B - - 100 - - 4 200 0 200
mixed B 90 90 100 2(C,D) 2(A,B) - 260 0 260
Table 4: Outcomes under highly dispersed reservation prices.
The second variation is illustrated in table 5 where consumers have their reser-
vation prices highly concentrated, but still the correlation is negative.
R1 R2 Rb
A 45 55 100
B 45 55 100
C 60 40 100
D 60 40 100
Table 5: Highly concentrated but negatively correlated reservation prices.
The first best solution now is given by consumers consuming both goods, yield-
ing welfare of 200. When the firm chooses the no bundling strategy, it sells prod-
uct 1 at 45, product 2 at 55, and all consumers buy good 1, consumers A and B
buy good 2. The firm obtains profits of 150, and consumers C and D retain a sur-
plus of 15 each. In contrast, under pure bundling, firm serves all consumers the
bundle at a price of 100 yielding profits of 200 e. Therefore, pure bundling is now
more profitable then no bundling in contrast with the previous case. Note that pure
bundling yields the first best total welfare and it is appropriated by the firm. There-
fore, mixed bundling cannot improve upon this situation from the firm’s viewpoint.
Table 6 summarizes.
The last example illustrates what is in fact the optimal situation for pure bundling
to dominate no bundling: the correlation of tests are negative and by bundling
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Strat. p1 p2 pb q1 q2 qb pi CS W
no B 45 55 - 4 2(A,B) - 150 30 180
pure B - - 100 - - 4 200 0 200
Table 6: Outcomes under highly concentrated but negatively correlated reservation
prices.
goods the total willingness to pay is harmonized. This allows the firm to better ex-
tract surplus. This is illustrated with the next and last example (see table 7), where
reservation prices are still negatively correlated, but in a lesser degree than in the
previous example. We will see now that bundling is still profitable, but in a lesser
degree than in the previous example.
R1 R2 Rb
A 51 49 100
B 51 49 100
C 49 51 100
D 49 51 100
Table 7: Highly concentrated but negatively correlated reservation prices.
Again the first best solution is given by consumers buying both goods at their
reservation prices yielding profits of 200. If the firm does not bundle it sells good
1 at price 49 and good 2 at also 49, with a profit of 192 e. Under pure bundling
the firm sells the bundle at a price of 100 and obtains 200 e. Hence again the
firm cashes in the first best welfare. However, notice that the difference with the
no-bundling profits is much smaller, as the lesser need for willingness to pay har-
monization. Table 8 summarizes.
Strat. p1 p2 pb q1 q2 qb pi CS W
no B 49 49 - 4 4 - 192 8 200
pure B - - 100 - - 4 200 0 200
Table 8: Outcomes under highly concentrated but negatively correlated reservation
prices.
The three examples illustrate the main point: pure bundling is more profitable
thna no bundling as long as correlation is not so negative that some valuations fall
below marginal cost.
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4 Bundling by a monopolist in market A
When a firm is a monopolist in one market, it may use bundling and tying as a
means to extend its market power to related or unrelated service market by altering
the market structure of these related services. These anticompetitive effects are
more likely the stronger is the tie- (the tie is stronger for pure bundles, then tying
and then mixed bundles).
The Chicago School has strongly criticised this view. An example with unit de-
mands illustrates why a monopolist may not be able to increase profit by bundling.
Assume that a bundle is composed of product star and its complement.4 There
is a monopolist selling the star product which renders a value v to the consumer.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the marginal cost of production of the
star product is zero. The complement good value for consumers is w. Its market
is perfectly competitive and the price is c. The star monopolist may also sell the
complement at a marginal cost of cm, which may be greater or smaller than c.
There are no fixed production costs. Complementarities imply an added value of a
bundle to consumers: 4 > 0. This is, the value of the bundle is v + w +4.
(i) No bundling by the monopolist: The price of the star product is v +4. The
monopolist may only sell its complement if cm ≤ c. The unit profits accrued
by sales of the star product are v+4, and the unit profits accrued by the sale
of the complement are: zero if cm > c and c− cm otherwise.
(ii) Pure bundling: The monopolist sells the product at a price P . Consumers
only purchase the bundle if it yields a higher surplus than the purchase of a
rivals complement with price c. This is, if v+w+4− P > w− c. Hence,
the maximum price P that the monopolist may charge is v + c +4, which
yields a unit profit for the bundle of v + c+4− cm.
Clearly if cm ≤ c profits of (i) and (ii) coincide. Otherwise- this is, when the mo-
nopolist is less efficient in the production of the complement good- the monopolist
4For example, think of hardaware and software, or a mobile phone ans its services, or a DTT
decoder and the programming content of the different TV channels to which the decoder gives access.
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loses out by bundling. The reason is that to extract the monopoly rents of the star
product (v +4), it must fix a price of the complement of c. If the monopolist is
inefficient, this implies “implicitly” selling complement at a loss.
Examples of this sort have been used by the Chicago School to argue that lever-
aging of market power cannot be a reason for bundling. However, the Chicago
School critique presumes a competitive market for product B, and when such as-
sumption is dropped, the conclusion is reversed. Indeed, Whinston (1990) shows
that with an oligopolistic market in the secondary good, a precommitment to bundling
constitutes a “promise” of aggressive price behavior which may allow a firm to
leverage market power by forcing exit of rivals in the secondary service. The
“promise” accrues because of the incentive to discount the bundle to push sales
(within the bundle) of the monopolized service. Hence, the anticompetitive effect
is more likely with complementary services.
Indeed that bundling could result in aggressive pricing, was already noted by
Telser (1979), which showed that in the bundle the implicit price of a tied commod-
ity could be smaller than its marginal cost. Consider a consumer i combining two
products in non-negative proportions. Telser (1979) shows that the volume of tied
sales may yield higher profits than selling both goods separately when the slopes
of the demand functions for the tied good are different.
There are also some papers that show how bundling strategies may hinder entry
in the monopoly and related markets.
Aghion and Bolton (1987), study how the penalties in the contracts with core
provisions affect the market structure of the complement product. Usually, con-
tracts with core provisions contain a penalty on the client should this client violate
those provisions. According to these authors, the penalty allows the monopolist to
appropriate part of the profit of an entrant in the market of the complement prod-
uct when the entrant enters after the signature of the contract of the product star.
LetD denote the penalty. Then, to attract a client the entrant must post a price
for the complement good with a discount high enough to compensate the client
against the loss D. This can only happen if the efficiency of the entrant is supe-
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rior enough to that of the monopolist, that is when c < cm + D. The monopolist
when determining D does not know how efficient the entrant will be. Therefore,
it may well happen that an entrant is more efficient than the monopolist, but no
enough to compensate the consumer the penalty D. In such case, there appears an
inefficiency because the entry of a more efficient competitor is blocked.
The work of Nalebuff (2004) and Carlton and Waldman (2002) identify the
economic mechanisms by which bundling may prevent entry of rival firms in the
monopolised market. Both papers are based on the idea that scale in the secondary
market is an indispensable condition for entry in the monopolised market. For ex-
ample, Carlton and Waldman (2002) model a situation where if there is no threat
of entry, there is no reason why the monopolist would bundle. Here the monopolist
only bundles to prevent entry of a rival who is more efficient in the production of a
complement good. This bundling harms the monopolist in the short term as there
are less sales of the rivals cheaper complement. Hence, as in Whinston, precom-
mitment is necessary for the anticompetitive effect to accrue.5 Contrarily, in Nale-
buff (2004) neither service complementarities nor precommitment is necessary for
entry-deterrence. In his setting the firm is a monopolist in both markets, and there
is an entry threat in one of them. Here, price discrimination by the monopolist pro-
vides the reason for bundling (which increases profits) but also the entry deterrence
effect since the discount of the bundle reduces the potential profits of a one-market
entrant.
Indeed these papers have been written to explain the Microsoft case. By some
accounts, Microsoft ties together Microsoft Windows, Internet Explorer, Outlook
Express and Microsoft Office. Microsoft’s view of it is that a web browser and a
mail reader are simply part of an operating system (and are included with all other
personal computer operating systems). Just as the definition of a car has changed to
include things that used to be separate products, such as speedometers and radios,
the definition of an operating system has changed to include those formerly sepa-
rate products. However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
5Choi and Stefanides (2001), in a setting with perfect complements, also rely on a commitment
to bundle as a means to deter entry.
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Microsoft’s claim that Internet Explorer was simply one facet of its operating sys-
tem (see Beckner and Gustafson, 2001). At the same time, the court held that the
tie between Windows and Internet Explorer should be analyzed under the Rule of
Reason. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). As to the
tying of Office, State Attorney Generals originally included a claim for harm for a
market for office productivity applications in the complaint they filed. (See Com-
plaint filed in New York v. Microsoft Corp. PP 88-95, 98, 117-19, No. 98-1233
(D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998)); the Attorney Generals abandoned that claim when
filing an amended complaint. The claim was revived by Novell where they al-
leged that computer original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) were charged less
for their Windows bulk purchases if they agreed to bundle Office with every PC
sold but that if they gave computer purchasers the choice whether or not to buy
Office along with their machines, the OEM’s bulk prices for Windows would rise,
making their computer prices less competitive in the market. The Novell litigation
is still ongoing.6
Finally, Spector (2007), shows that a firm enjoying monopoly power in one
market and being active in another oligopolistic market may find it profitable to tie
products in both markets in order to facilitate collusion in the oligopolistic market.
Also, Egli (2007) shows that in the Hotelling’s model of horizontal differentiation,
firms choose not to differentiate due to the competition-softening effect of tie-in
sales.
Tying of goods or services occurs when a firm makes the purchase of one prod-
uct over which it has monopoly power (the so-called tying good) conditional on the
purchase of a second good competitively provided (the tied good). In other words,
a firm by tying goods can try to extend its market power in the market of the tying
good to the market of the tied good. Tying goods is therefore a particular form
of bundling with the aim of maximizing profits. It typically appears when the de-
mands for the two goods are complementary, or when the tying good is regulated,
and the regulated price is below the firm’s profit maximizing price level. Then, the
6See Civil No. JFM-05-1087.
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firm would use this strategy to increase the price of the tied good in an attempt to
maximize the overall profit. Generically, tying is considered as an anticompetitive
strategy and thus subject to close scrutiny by the antitrust authorities. Tying may
be the action of several companies, as well as the work of just one firm. A clas-
sic example of tying is the selling of razors at a loss and making the profit on the
blades. References on definitions and examples of tie-in sales (and bundling) can
be found in Adams and Yellen (1976), Burstein (1960, 1988), Choi (2004), and
Whinston (1990).
Tying may also be a form of price discrimination: people who use more blades,
for example, pay disproportionately more than those who just need a one-time
shave. Though this may improve overall welfare, by giving more consumers access
to the market, such price discrimination can also transfer consumer surplus to the
producer. Tying may also be used with or in place of intellectual property to help
protect entry into a market, encouraging innovation. Tying is often used when
the supplier makes one product that is critical to many customers. By threatening
to withhold that key product unless others are also purchased, the supplier can
increase sales of less necessary products.
Consider a consumer i combining these two products in non-negative propor-
tions ai1 and ai2. Different consumers differ in these proportions. The price of the
composite good for consumer i is thus,
piB = ai1p1 + ai2p2,
where p1 and p2 represent the prices of the two goods. Assume also that the de-
mand for the bundle is linear and given by,
qiB = b0i − b1ipiB,
where b0i > 0 and b1i > 0.
Finally, assume a technology defined by the absence of fixed costs and a con-
stant marginal cost of producing qj , (j = 1, 2) denoted by cj . This implies that
from the technological point of view, tying does not imply any advantage to the
firm. Therefore, only strategic reasons would justify the use of tying. With this
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assumptions, Whinston (1990), using a similar model shows that technological
precommitment to tying has important strategic effects and may allow a firm to use
the leverage provided by its power in one market to foreclose another market (see
Tirole, 1988 pp. 333-335).
5 Bundling when all firms can bundle services
When there are no barriers to entry in any of the bundled parts, bundling can be
the action of several companies, as well as he work of just one of them. A clas-
sic example of this is the selling of razons at a loss and the making of profit on
blades. Hence, the papers which have analysed bundling in such circumstances,
study whether bundling Nash equilibria emerge in competition games. Before de-
scribing the literature is worth pointing out that almost all of it deals with situations
where the services to be bundled are differentiated. This is reasonable, as product
homogeneity diminishes the interest of this topic. For example, if all services were
homogeneous goods, Bertrand pricing would take place and bundling would make
no difference to this outcome. A first distinction to be made between the papers
dealing with bundling and competition is whether in those the bundling decision is
a pre-commitment before prices for services are chosen, or whether bundling is a
marketing option in itself, chosen simultaneously with prices.
Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) are two classical references for the first
of the two options. In both papers the authors consider a two firm setting where
consumers are characterized by their position (i, j) in a Hotelling square of unit
side with a transport cost of t. A consumer who purchases product 1 from firm A
at price P1A and product 2 from firm B at price P2B has a utility of W − P1A −
P2B−t(i)−t(1−j), whereW is the willingness to pay for the services. Consumers
choose their purchases to maximize utility. Figure 7 illustrates how demands look
like when both firms use symmetric prices and strategies [(a) pure components
pricing, (b) pure bundling and (c) mixed bundling].
In Matutes and Regibeau (1988) the authors compare the outcomes with pure
bundling and with separate prices showing that pure bundling is a worse option for
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Figure 7: Demand under different pricing strategies.
both firms.7 The reason is double. First, pure component pricing allows consumers
to benefit from variety raising their willingness to pay and increasing demand.8 In
turn, this increases the firms profit. Second, there is a strategic effect which has to
do with the size of the marginal consumer. With pure bundling reducing the bun-
dle price results in more sales of product A and B (for example in Figure 7(b), this
shifts the boundary of the demand region outwards forA). With component pricing
reducing the price of a component raises this demand but also increases sales of the
complement product, but here both for firm A or for firm B. Hence, there is less
of an incentive to reduce prices. Component pricing softens competition and this,
in turn increases firms profits. In the second paper, the authors compare the situa-
tion with pure component pricing and the situation with mixed bundling, showing
that the game has a prisoner dilemma structure with a “sub-optimal” equilibrium
which is that both firms engage in mixed bundling where pure component pricing
would be best for both as the mixed bundling equilibrium results in lower prices
for all services. In this setting if firms could precommit not to engage in bundling
they would. In an example based in this paper Armstrong (2006) explains that the
aggressiveness induced by mixed bundling is due to the fact that bundling makes
consumers more homogeneous, raising the size of the marginal consumer.
A recent work by Thanassoulis (2007) has casted light into the effects of mixed
bundling on consumer surplus and welfare by making the distinction between
7Economides (1989) generalizes the analysis for n firms.
8In the paper situations where not all the market is covered are studied.
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“firm specific preferences” and “product specific preferences” and by setting a
model where there are “small” consumers who only wish to purchase one good
and “large” consumers who wish to purchase both goods.
Using this terminology, the papers by Matutes and Regibeau depict a situation
where only “product specific preferences” exist (this is each product is differen-
tiated as opposed to there being a brand preference which is independent of the
number of products considered) and where there are no “small” consumers. In-
deed, even with “small” consumers, where there are only product specific prefer-
ences, Thanassoulis obtains the same outcome as Matutes and Regibeau: mixed
bundling is a dominant equilibrium of a game with a prisoner dilemma structure
where both firms lose out because of the discounts. However, with “firm specific
preferences” mixed bundling results in more profits for both firms with respect to
the situation with pure component pricing. The intuition is clear. In this situation
with pure component pricing, firms compete for “small” and “large” consumers
with exactly the same instruments and are unable to segment those demands. In
this situation competition for large consumers yields a protective shield for small
consumers. However, mixed bundling (i.e. price discrimination) undoes this pro-
tection and small consumers suffer from large prices for individual goods.
6 The Spanish case
We argue next that, as the telecommunication sector in Spain is not monopolized (it
is rather an oligopoly), and that competition seems to prevail in all of the markets
for products susceptible to be bundled with telecommunications, we are not facing
any equity issue justifying regulation. Thus, the bundling strategies used by the
firms competing in the Spanish telecommunications market can only be related
to technological reasons. In this sense, bundling per se should not be object of
regulation by the Spanish telecommunications agency. This is not to say that the
telecommunications itself market should not be surveiled and regulated.
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6.1 Historical perspective
In Spain, it was the cable operators that were the first ones to have the possibility
to, and did go for, bundling distinct services. Nowadays, not only these operators
but also other that use other technologies currently bundle services. For instance,
currently more than half of the ADSL sold in Spain is bundled with voice calls.
Table 9 reports the number of residential clients by type of service purchased.
Services Clients
Only internet 665532
Only television 223841
Only phone services 9351270
Internet+Voice bundle 3526511
TV+Voice bundle 428256
TV+Internet bundle 61168
TV+Voice+Internet bundle 956530
Source: CMT Annual Report, December 2006.
Table 9: Residential clients by type of service purchased.
Although we will discuss this in more detail below, let us advance that most of
the bundling carried out has taken the mixed form. This allows us to check how
much discount does the purchase of the bundle bring to the consumer in each of
the services. For instance, Telefonica offers a flat rate for national voice calls of
15 Euros per month, and also a 1Mega ADSL service at 39,07 Euros per month,
for a total of 54,07 Euros per month if purchased separately. In contrast, if the
bundles is purchased the price per month is 39,90 Euros per month. (These fees do
not include the fixed line rental fee.). Hence, bundle purchasers are getting their
national voice calls service almost for free.
The addition of calls to cellular phones has been added to the package just re-
cently. We therefore exclude this from our descriptive analysis. One should expect
the inclusion of this service in the bundle in the coming years. This is precisely one
of the points of the paper by Matutes and Regibeau (1992): a firm’s best response
to mixed bundling by a rival firm is to also engage in mixed bundling.9
9The inclusion of international voice calls in the package has proven to be rather more difficult.
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6.2 The current situation
In the Spanish market, there are several products offered through broadband telecom-
munications that are usually subject to bundling: broadband access, voice calls
(usually restricted to national calls), Web services (space), and TV. Basically, firms
compete in pure bundling of the first three products while they engage in mixed
bundling as for the third. An exception is ONO, who offers all possible combina-
tions of the different products.
Company Speed National calls Web space Price TV
Arrakis 1 yes 50 58,26 no
Comunitel/Tele 2 1 yes 50 38,10 no
3 yes 50 56,80 no
20 yes 50 46,28 no
Euskaltel 0,3 no 25 27,84 no
3 no 25 45,24 no
12 no 25 87,00 no
24 no 25 139,20 no
Jazztel 20 yes 25 32,37 no
3 yes 25 27,70 no
6 yes 25 48,14 yes
1 no 25 9,98 no
ONO* 6 yes no 58,00 no
12 yes no 69,60 no
25 yes no 87,00 no
6 yes no 64,35 yes*
12 yes no 75,95 yes*
25 yes no 81,50 yes*
Orange 1 yes 100 39,09 no
6 yes 100 44,89 no
20 yes 100 50,69 no
2 yes 100 59,90 yes
Telefonica 1 yes 50 50,39 no
3 yes 50 62,20 no
3 yes 50 83,63 yes
10 yes 50 73,89 no
20 yes 50 189,9 no
*“Essential” TV package. Two higher quality packages exist.
Source: http://www.adslzone.net/comparativa.html and published data by companies.
Table 10: Main competitors’ menus of offers in Spain.
28
Figure 8: Speed and price in Spanish broadband telecommunications market.
Table 10 reports the main competitors’ menus of offers as of September 7,
2007. We have omitted fixed entry costs like enrollment fee and the cost of the
router. The broadband speed is in Mb per second, upstream. The Web space is
in Mb. The price per month, in Euro, includes the monthly connection fee, the
decoder monthly rental fee if TV is offered, and the VAT. The figures for Ya.com
are not included since this company had previously been absorbed by Orange.
Figure 8 depicts the scatter plot of speed and price as reported in Table 10. No-
tice that some points represent offers including TV while other do not. Moreover,
the different TV packages are not easily compared, due to the inclusion of more
or less channels, pay per view conditions, and so on. Therefore, the interpretation
should be done with care. As one can see, competition exists in all products and
quality (speed) segments. It is therefore quite unlikely that firms are engaging in
anticompetitive behavior, at least through bundling.
Although it is true that the analysis conducted in Section 3 was made under
the assumption that a single operator was active in the market, some of the in-
sights gained are suggestive. After all , the Spanish market is greatly dominated by
Telefonica, who serves 61% of the market of broadband access. In particular, we
have seen that the advantages of mixed bundling versus pure bundling depend on
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the correlations and dispersion of tastes in the populations. Namely, if some con-
sumers value the different goods in a similar way whereas others value the goods
very differently and with a very negative correlation (recall the restaurant exam-
ple), then advantages of mixed bundling are reinforced. Of course, in theory mixed
bundling dominates over pure bundling as mixed bundling allows the firm to use
two more price instruments. In other words, the firm can always reproduce, though
mixed bundling, the pure bundling demand configuration. According to this one
should always observe mixed bundling. This argument, however, does not take
into account complexity and administrative issues (mixed bundling is more com-
plex than pure bundling). Hence, it does make sense to use pure bundling when
tastes over the different goods are not too negatively correlated.
Now, what do we observe in Spain? The dominant firm mostly advertises
its duo and trio packages. This is tantamount to offering a pure bundle in the
broadband access and national voice calls markets while offering a partial mixed
bundling menu in the broadband-plus-calls and TV markets. We say partial be-
cause while the consumer can choose not to purchase TV (if he or she opts for the
duo), he or she cannot choose to purchase TV alone. This suggests that consumers’
tastes over broadband access and calls are not too disperse: mots consumers value
the two goods in more or less the same way. In contrast, some consumers value
the TV trough the internet package a lot while some other consumers do not value
it too much. Notice that the tastes for the TV package are not to be understood
as the tastes for the whole package, as most consumer have access to the main TV
channels for free through DTT or analogical access. What is left? mostly the the-
matic channels (sports, movies, and so on). It is quite likely that consumers’ tastes
over such channels be very dispersed. We could even reinterpret Table 1 above as
follows. The reservation value R1 would stand for the willingness to pay for the
pure bundle of broadband access and calls, whereas the reservation valueR2 would
stand for the willingness to pay for the thematic channels. There would be people
like A, who do not value the pure bundle broadband-calls but value (some of) the
thematic channels a lot; there would be people like D with exactly the opposite
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preferences; and there would be people like B or C who value the two more or
less the same. If preferences for broadband access and calls are aligned through-
out the population, in the sense that if someone values broadband a lot it will also
value calls a lot and viceversa, this would explain why these two goods are bundled
without the option of separate purchase.
7 Concluding remarks
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